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I. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policies can represent a country’s effort to circumscribe 
a national culture. Beyond merely regulating the size and diversity of a 
population, these policies also attempt to shape a nation’s identity and 
social order.1 As Daniel J. Tichenor—in his Dividing Lines: The Politics 
of Immigration Control in America—writes, nations “define themselves 
through the official selection and control of foreigners seeking permanent 
residence on their soil.”2 The United States is no exception, having used 
its immigration policy to define itself, at least in part, through national 
notions of morality.3 
The United States has made admissibility and deportability decisions 
based on foreigners’ moral conduct since 1891, when Congress expressly 
excluded from entry noncitizens who had committed a crime involving 
“moral turpitude” (CIMT).4 Legislative history on the matter suggests that 
this represented an attempt to establish a national system of morals.5 
Rather than excluding noncitizens based on inherently wrongful conduct 
(or conduct that would be considered morally turpitudinous in their 
countries of origin), noncitizen conduct was judged according to U.S. 
standards.6 Perhaps the most explicit acknowledgment of Congress’s 
effort to create a national morality comes from case law; the “obvious 
Congressional purpose [of the moral turpitude provision] is to keep 
persons who are likely to be undesirable residents or sojourners from 
being in our midst.”7 
Though the decision to enforce a national system of morality (and to 
1. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN
AMERICA 1 (2002). 
2. Id. 
3. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 350 (1950). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 351-54. 
6. Id. at 351. 
7. Knoetze v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 201, 231 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss2/8
2017] ON MORAL GROUNDS 579 
hold noncitizens to this standard) makes some sense,8 it has also posed 
certain challenges as cultural norms are not static; they inevitably change 
as society progresses.9 Therefore, the definition of “moral turpitude” has 
proven elusive, and efforts to develop an acceptable framework for its 
application have failed.10 
This is problematic because our application of the phrase “moral 
turpitude” is of profound importance for noncitizens.11 For those seeking 
lawful entrance into the United States, for instance, a conviction of a 
CIMT renders them ineligible to receive a visa and ineligible for 
admission.12 For those who have already been properly admitted to the 
country (lawful permanent residents), the commission of a CIMT can 
result in their removal.13 Undocumented aliens are especially at risk of 
deportation.14 While these noncitizens can typically request that the 
Justice Department prevent their deportation, this discretionary relief is 
not available for those who have been convicted of crimes involving 
moral turpitude.15 Given its severe consequences, a conviction of a CIMT 
is clearly undesirable for a noncitizen. But without a uniform definition 
for the phrase “moral turpitude,” defense attorneys often struggle to 
8. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 353 (“While the visa instructions define moral turpitude as an act
which in itself is one of baseness, vileness, or depravity, the applicability of the excluding provision 
often depends on what the individual officer considers to be baseness, vileness, or depravity.”). 
9. Id. at 351. 
10. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has already rejected a “void for vagueness” 
argument. In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951), the court determined that “difficulty in 
determining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack 
as vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness.” 
11. Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 316 (2011) (“The current INA imposes 
severe immigration penalties on a noncitizen, including a lawful permanent resident (LPR), for a 
CIMT conviction, such as inadmissibility, deportation, and ineligibility for discretionary adjustment 
of status.”).  
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“[A]liens . . . are ineligible
to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States [if] . . . convicted of, or . . . admits 
having committed or . . . admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime 
involving moral turpitude”.). 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (stating that any alien who
has been convicted of a CIMT and who could face a sentence of one year or longer, can be removed). 
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A)(i) (2016) (“[A]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission, and . . . is convicted of a 
crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.”). 
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2016) indicates that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal of,
and adjust the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is 
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has not been convicted of an offence 
under 1182(a)(2) . . . of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2016) provides that any alien 
convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a 
crime” is inadmissible. 
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provide adequate advice to their clients, not knowing whether a plea 
bargain will result in their client’s removal from the country.16 
In this Article, I explore the creation, collapse, and recreation of a 
uniform framework for the application of the “moral turpitude” provisions 
in immigration law. Part II demonstrates that the collapse of the previous 
framework was instructive; it showed that identification of a CIMT hinges 
on the noncitizen’s conviction, not the specific conduct that led to the 
conviction. Part III details the modern framework that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has applied to identify CIMTs—the realistic 
probability test. In Part IV, I criticize the BIA’s modern framework. I, 
instead, advocate for application of the least culpable conduct test—an 
approach that limits the applicability of the phrase “moral turpitude.” 
Unlike the realistic probability test, the least culpable conduct test has a 
rich legal history and preserves a noncitizen’s access to justice. Part V 
concludes that whether the circuit courts owe deference to the BIA’s 
modern framework is immediately questionable. 
II. A HISTORY OF IDENTIFYING CIMTS
The BIA has offered a general definition of the phrase “moral 
turpitude,” indicating that it refers to behavior that is “inherently base, 
vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the 
duties owed between persons or society in general.”17 The Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), however, neither defines the phrase “moral 
turpitude” nor establishes a framework with which to apply this language; 
as a result, courts have historically developed inconsistent applications of 
the act’s moral turpitude provisions.18 
16. See Eric H. Singer, The Muddle of Determining Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 45 
MD. B.J. 54, 57 (2012) (“In short, after Silva-Trevino, your client may be left holding the proverbial 
bag after all, and you and your fellow practitioners and enforcement authorities are certainly left with 
what can be described only as an intellectual mess.”); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the 
Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 259 (2012) (“Indeed, the process of determining whether a given criminal 
conviction triggers an immigration sanction can require extensive analysis of criminal and 
immigration statutes, prior caselaw, and scrutiny of the criminal record of conviction. At times, it is 
not an assessment that can be made quickly, or with obvious answers.”).  
17. In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 949 (B.I.A. 2014). 
18. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Federal courts have long struggled in 
administering and applying [the INA’s] moral turpitude provisions.”); Dadhania, supra note 11, at 
317 (“Despite its severe ramifications and long history, moral turpitude is not defined in the INA. The 
legislative history of federal immigration statutes using the term suggests that the precise definition 
should be formulated by administrative and judicial decisions.”).   
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A. Silva-Trevino I: The Creation of a Uniform Three-Step Analysis 
In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey addressed this issue in 
Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino I; his opinion established a “uniform 
framework” for the application of the INA’s moral turpitude provisions.19 
In this case, the respondent was a citizen of Mexico lawfully admitted to 
the United States as a permanent resident.20 After he entered a plea of no 
contest to the offense of “indecency with a child,”21 the Department of 
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.22 The 
respondent requested discretionary relief from removal, arguing that the 
Texas statute under which he was convicted does not require a defendant 
to have knowledge of a child’s age in order to be found guilty.23 The 
respondent, therefore, reasoned that the statute “permits convictions in 
cases that do not involve moral turpitude,” such as in cases “where the 
defendant honestly and reasonably believed his sexual contact was with a 
consenting adult.”24 The immigration judge rejected the respondent’s 
argument, but the BIA reached a different conclusion and indicated that 
the respondent was eligible for discretionary relief.25 The BIA held that 
the respondent’s “conviction, whatever its actual facts, should not be 
considered a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude because [the 
Texas statute] criminalizes at least some conduct that does not involve 
moral turpitude.”26 
Here the BIA applied a specific categorical approach—called the 
“least culpable conduct” test—to identify a CIMT. Under this framework, 
the court looks only at the respondent’s conviction, determines the 
statutory elements necessary for that conviction, and asks whether morally 
turpitudinous behavior is required to meet those elements.27 If one can 
conceive of a theoretical scenario where the statute can be violated 
without morally base conduct, the crime is not considered a CIMT.28 
Rejecting the BIA’s application of the least culpable conduct test, 
19. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688. 
20. Id. at 690. 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 691. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 692. 
27. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 326 (“The least culpable conduct test considers whether moral 
turpitude would inhere in the minimum conduct sufficiently to satisfy the elements of the offense.”); 
Koh, supra note 16, at 283 (“[The] courts must identify the least culpable conduct that could possibly 
violate the statute.”). 
28. Supra note 27. 
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Attorney General Mukasey certified the case for review and applied a new 
approach to identify CIMTs—one that allowed inquiry beyond the statute 
of conviction.29 Mukasey set forth a three-step analysis, indicating that 
adjudicators should first determine whether there is a realistic chance 
(rather than a theoretical possibility) that a statute reaches conduct that 
does not involve moral turpitude.30 Where this first step proves 
inconclusive, immigration judges were to look at the respondent’s “record 
of conviction, including documents such as the indictment, the judgment 
of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea 
transcript.”31 Finally, if consideration of this record still did not resolve 
the inquiry, the third step allows judges to consider any other evidence 
necessary to “resolve accurately the moral turpitude question.”32 
Applying this rule, Mukasey remanded the case to the BIA.33 He reasoned 
that whether the respondent “knew or should have known the victim’s age 
is a critical factor in determining whether his . . . crime involved moral 
turpitude for immigration purposes.”34 
Mukasey’s three-step analysis represented a novel approach to the 
identification of CIMTs. Though it contained elements of traditional 
categorical approaches, its third step deviated substantially from accepted 
norms. The first step of Mukasey’s analysis mirrors a type of categorical 
approach called the “realistic probability” test.35 Under this test, a 
noncitizen must prove that there is a realistic probability that a statute 
could be violated without morally turpitudinous conduct.36 To meet this 
burden, the noncitizen must point to specific cases where a defendant was 
found to have violated the statute without engaging in morally 
turpitudinous behavior.37 Mukasey’s second step exemplifies a “modern 
categorical approach.” This approach is typically applied when a statute 
contains several portions, some of which can be violated without morally 
turpitudinous behavior and others that cannot.38 When this is the case, a 
judge can look beyond the statute, consider the noncitizen’s individual 
29. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. 
30. Id. at 698. 
31. Id. at 704. 
32. Id.
33. Id. at 705. 
34. Id.
35. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 327. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 328 (“Adjudicators focus on the actual scope of the statute of conviction by asking
whether any actual case exists where the criminal statute was applied to conduct that was not 
turpitudinous. A noncitizen must provide evidence of an actual case where the statute in question was 
used to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude.”).  
38. Id. at 329. 
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“record of conviction,” and determine what portion of the statute the 
noncitizen violated. The record of conviction consists of several 
documents (all related to the specific conviction in question): the charging 
document, the plea agreement, the record of the sentence, the plea 
colloquy transcript, the indictment, or the jury instructions.39 If the inquiry 
is not resolved after looking at these documents, Mukasey’s approach 
allowed the judge to go one step further and look into facts outside the 
record—whatever facts he deemed necessary. This third step broke from 
tradition and gave judges a great deal of discretion; with “Silva-Trevino, 
the previous limitations that prevented the immigration court from 
viewing the record and evidence supporting the conviction [were] 
essentially discarded, which significantly [increased] the risk of 
inconsistent application of the moral turpitude law.”40  
Following Mukasey’s opinion, the BIA remanded the case back to 
the immigration judge, who applied the Attorney General’s new rule and 
determined that the respondent was ineligible for discretionary relief from 
removal.41 
B. The Deterioration of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I Standard 
Far from establishing a uniform interpretation of the phrase “moral 
turpitude,” the third step of Mukasey’s framework led to disagreement 
among the circuits—with some giving deference to his approach and 
others deciding that it was a clear violation of language contained in the 
INA.42 
A minority of circuit courts—consisting only of the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits—decided to apply the Silva-Trevino I standard.43 In Mata-
Guerrero v. Holder, an alien from Mexico sought a waiver of 
inadmissibility; he argued that his conviction for failing to register as a 
39. See Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (indicating that the charging
document, plea agreement, verdict or judgment of conviction, record of the sentence and the plea 
colloquy transcript are part of the “record of conviction”); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 
(1990) (indicating that the indictment and the jury instructions are parts of the “record of conviction”).  
40. Nathanael C. Crowley, Comment, Naked Dishonesty: Misuse of a Social Security Number 
for an Otherwise Legal Purpose May Not be a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude After All, 15 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 205, 221 (2013).   
41. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 2014). 
42. Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 552 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (“[F]ive 
courts of appeals [have] . . . rejected the third step of Attorney General Mukasey’s framework as 
contrary to the unambiguous language of the statute and thus refused to accord the Silva-Trevino 
opinion deference.”). 
43. Id. 
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sex offender (as required under Wisconsin law) was not a CIMT.44 
Though the immigration judge and the BIA decided that the petitioner had 
committed a CIMT, the Seventh Circuit remanded and instructed the BIA 
to apply Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard.45 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted that Chevron deference “assumes that an 
agency has taken a careful look at the general legal issue and has adopted 
a reasonably consistent approach to it.”46 Because the BIA had only 
applied a categorical approach to determine that the petitioner had 
committed a CIMT, the Seventh Circuit instructed the BIA to conduct an 
“individualized inquiry” into the petitioner’s conviction—a fact-specific 
inquiry consistent with the third step of the Silva-Trevino I standard.47 
In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit also afforded Chevron deference 
to the Attorney General’s approach. In Bobadilla v. Holder, an alien from 
Canada was convicted of giving a false name to a peace officer.48 Though 
the BIA decided that the alien’s offense was categorically a CIMT, the 
circuit court remanded.49 It found that the BIA had failed to apply the first 
step of the Silva-Trevino I standard and did not determine if there was a 
realistic probability that a conviction could arise from conduct that was 
not morally turpitudinous.50 
Though the Seventh and Eighth Circuits decided to apply Mukasey’s 
Silva-Trevino I standard, most other circuits rejected Mukasey’s 
framework. The Third Circuit became the first to do so in 2009.51 In Jean-
Louis v. Attorney General of the United States, the appellant was a native 
citizen of Haiti.52 After he pled guilty to committing simple assault against 
a child under 12 years of age, the Department of Homeland Security 
declared the appellant removable under the INA.53 The appellant admitted 
removability but sought to cancel his removal, contending that 
cancellation was appropriate because he had resided in the United States 
for a period of seven years.54 An alien’s period of continuous residency 
44. Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 257 (7th Cir. 2010). 
45. Id. at 261. 
46. Id. at 259. 
47. Id. at 261. 
48. Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir. 2012). 
49. Id. at 1059. 
50. Id.
51. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We 
conclude that deference is not owed to Silva-Trevino’s novel approach and thus will apply our 
established methodology.”). 
52. Id. at 464. 
53. Id.
54. Id. 
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terminates, though, when the alien is convicted of a CIMT.55 Both the 
immigration judge and the BIA determined that the appellant’s conviction 
of simple assault constituted a CIMT.56 But the circuit court reversed, 
holding that the appellant was not convicted of a CIMT.57 The court 
adhered to its own precedent on the matter, applied a least culpable 
conduct test, and expressly rejected Mukasey’s novel three-step 
analysis.58 
The Third Circuit criticized step one of the Silva-Trevino I 
framework, stating that application of a realistic probability test is 
impracticable; unlike the least culpable conduct test, it does not allow 
courts to develop a body of case law that decides “whether various state 
criminal statutes fall within the scope of the ‘crime involving moral 
turpitude’ offense.”59 The Third Circuit also rejected the third-step in the 
Silva-Trevino I framework. The INA uses the term “convicted” when 
discussing crimes involving moral turpitude.60 According to the court, this 
term “forecloses individualized inquiry into an alien’s specific conduct 
and does not permit examination of extra-record conviction.”61 
After the Third Circuit rejected Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard, 
several others followed suit.62 And upon reviewing the Silva-Trevino I 
case in 2014, the Fifth Circuit became the latest circuit to reject Mukasey’s 
framework.63 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that when a statute is 
ambiguous and an implementing agency’s interpretation of that statute is 
reasonable, Chevron demands that the court apply the agency 
interpretation.64 But, like the Third Circuit, the court analyzed what it 
called the “convicted of” clause of the INA and found no ambiguity and, 
thus, no reason to give deference to Mukasey’s interpretive framework.65 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 465. 
57. Id. at 482. 
58. Id. at 470. 
59. Id. at 482 (internal citation omitted). 
60. Id. at 474. 
61. Id.
62. See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A CIMT . . . [is] a
generic crime whose description is complete unto itself, such that ‘involving moral turpitude’ is an 
element of the crime. Because it is an element of the generic crime, an IJ is limited to the record of 
conviction.”); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude that the plain 
language of the moral turpitude statute is not ambiguous.”); Farjardo v. United States Att’y Gen., 659 
F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We agree with the Third and Eighth Circuits that Congress 
unambiguously intended adjudicators to use the categorical and modified approach to determine 
whether a person was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.”).  
63. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014). 
64. Id. at 199. 
65. Id. at 200. 
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The act provides that “any alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral 
turpitude” is inadmissible,66 and, as a result, the alien is also ineligible for 
discretionary relief.67 The court stated that the legislature established a 
limited list of documents that “may be considered as proof of such a 
conviction,” and there is no evidence that additional extrinsic evidence 
may be considered to identify a CIMT.68 Finding that the legislature 
unambiguously limited the court’s inquiry to the record of conviction,69 
the Fifth Circuit joined four other circuit courts in refusing to give 
deference to Mukasey’s three-step framework.70 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the Silva-Trevino I 
framework, Attorney General Eric Holder issued an opinion—known as 
Silva-Trevino II—and expressly vacated Mukasey’s approach: 
In view of the decisions of five courts of appeals rejecting the framework 
set out in Attorney General Mukasey’s opinion—which have created 
disagreement among the circuits and disinformation in the Board’s ap-
plication of immigration law—as well as intervening Supreme Court de-
cisions that cast doubt on the continued validity of the opinion, I con-
clude that it is appropriate to vacate the . . . opinion in its entirety.71 
After Holder’s decision to vacate the Silva-Trevino I three-step approach, 
it became clear that immigration judges could not look beyond a 
noncitizen’s record of conviction to determine whether he committed a 
CIMT. But courts were left without a national standard for determining 
whether a crime involved moral turpitude.72 
C. Confusion Following the Rejection of Silva-Trevino I 
The lack of a clear standard led to confusion, and court decisions 
following Holder’s opinion possessed limited precedential value. This is 
demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s Arias v. Lynch decision, where it 
considered the following question: does social security number (SSN) 
misrepresentation necessarily involve morally turpitudinous behavior?73 
The petitioner was an Ecuador native who came to the United States 
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2016).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2016). 
68. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 200. 
69. Id. 
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
71. Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
72. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e remand to the Board to consider 
Arias’s case under an appropriate legal framework for judging moral turpitude.”). 
73. Id. at 824. 
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without authorization in 2000.74 During her time in the States, the 
petitioner worked at a cabinet company in order to support her three 
children.75 In 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to just one year probation 
for a conviction of falsely using a SSN in order to obtain employment at 
the cabinet company; the indictment charged her with an intent to deceive 
her employer.76 After the petitioner served her year-long probation, 
however, she received employment authorization and was rehired by the 
same cabinet company.77 As the court put it, the company “did not have a 
problem with [the petitioner’s] deception and does not view itself as a 
victim.”78 Nevertheless, in 2010, the petitioner was asked to appear for 
removal proceedings; she admitted removability but requested 
discretionary relief.79 
The immigration judge held that discretionary relief was unavailable 
because the petitioner had committed a CIMT.80 On appeal, the BIA 
reached the same conclusion.81 Acknowledging that the Silva-Trevino I 
framework had been vacated, the BIA claimed only to look at the record 
of conviction and concluded that a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) 
categorically involves morally turpitudinous behavior.82 The BIA held 
that “‘[a]n intent to deceive for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining a 
benefit is an element of the offense, and therefore the offense is 
categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.’”83 
Though the BIA expressly stated that its inquiry was limited to the 
petitioner’s record of conviction, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case 
and found that the BIA—whether it did so knowingly or not—looked 
beyond petitioner’s conviction and, therefore, wrongly applied the 
vacated Silva-Trevino I approach.84 The Seventh Circuit reached this 
conclusion by looking at the language of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).85 That 
statute criminalizes the misrepresentation of a SSN in order to either 
receive a benefit or for any other purpose.86 The Seventh Circuit pointed 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 825. 
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. 
79. Id.
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 826 (internal citation omitted). 
84. Id. at 829-30. 
85. Id. at 826. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-327) provides: “for the purpose of
obtaining anything of value from another person, or for any other purpose . . . with the intent to 
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out that the BIA’s opinion selectively quoted the statute, only including 
language regarding the misuse of a SSN to obtain a benefit.87 The court 
reasoned, then, that the BIA tailored the statute to the petitioner’s specific 
situation, acknowledged that the petitioner misused a SSN to obtain the 
benefit of employment, and deemed the crime an instance of moral 
turpitude; in other words, the BIA must have incorrectly applied the 
vacated Silva-Trevino I standard, looking beyond the record of conviction 
to consider the petitioner’s specific conduct.88 As a result, the Seventh 
Circuit remanded the case to the Board in order to “consider [petitioner’s] 
case under an appropriate legal framework for judging moral turpitude.”89 
This case highlights the problems that arise when a uniform standard 
has not been adopted. First, the Seventh Circuit was simply unable to 
resolve the petitioner’s issue. The court could merely defer the case to the 
BIA and request that it develop a uniform standard. Second, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision seems oddly contradictory, as it had to make 
assumptions regarding the BIA’s approach to the identification of CIMTs. 
Consider the following inconsistency. The court first acknowledged that 
the petitioner’s specific conduct shows that she only committed a 
victimless crime; yet, it concluded that the BIA must have considered this 
specific conduct in order to conclude that the petitioner’s crime was 
morally turpitudinous. 
III. SILVA-TREVINO REVISITED: THE MODERN FRAMEWORK
In response to both judicial confusion regarding this area of the law 
and Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision to vacate the Silva-Trevino 
I standard, the BIA revisited the Silva-Trevino case and articulated the 
current standard for identifying CIMTs. Once circuit courts established 
that an immigration judge cannot look beyond a noncitizen’s record of 
conviction, it logically followed that the BIA had to apply a traditional 
categorical approach: either the realistic probability test or the least 
culpable conduct test. It chose to apply the realistic probability test, the 
same categorical approach that was to be applied under step one of the 
vacated Silva-Trevino I standard.90 
deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account number assigned by the 
Commissioner of Social Security to him or to another person . . . shall be guilty of a felony.” 
(emphasis added in text). 
87. Arias, 834 F.3d at 830. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 831 (B.I.A. 2016) (“In evaluating the
criminal statute under the categorical approach, unless circuit court law dictates otherwise, we apply 
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In other words, it does not matter whether a scenario can be imagined 
where a statute can be violated without morally turpitudinous behavior. 
Instead, under this realistic probability test, there has to be a realistic 
chance that a statute could be applied to conduct that does not constitute 
moral turpitude.91 A noncitizen can meet this burden by pointing to a 
specific case where the statute was violated without morally base 
behavior.92 As is the case with any categorical approach, the realistic 
probability test forbids inquiry into the noncitizen’s specific behavior.93 
Only when a statute contains multiple provisions—some that reach 
morally turpitudinous behavior and others that do not—can the court look 
beyond the statute and consider the noncitizen’s record of conviction.94 
This record can only be used for the limited purpose of determining under 
what part of the statute the noncitizen was convicted.95 
Applying this new standard, the BIA analyzed the Texas statute 
criminalizing indecency with a child, noted that conviction under this 
statute does not require knowledge of the victim’s age, and, therefore, 
concluded that the respondent’s crime does not categorically involve 
moral turpitude.96 
IV. ARGUMENT: THE BIA SHOULD APPLY THE LEAST CULPABLE
CONDUCT TEST 
Silva-Trevino I was vacated because it incorrectly allowed a judge to 
look beyond a noncitizen’s record of conviction. Thus, the BIA was 
correct to apply a traditional categorical approach to the identification of 
CIMTs. But no categorical test is perfect. Because neither the realistic 
the realistic probability test. This requires us to focus on the minimum conduct that has a realistic 
probability of being prosecuted under the statute of conviction, rather than on the facts underlying the 
respondent’s particular violation of that statute.”).  
91. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“Imagination is not, however, the appropriate standard under the framework set 
forth in this opinion. Instead, the question is whether there is a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility,’ that the Texas statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral 
turpitude.”) (internal citation omitted).  
92. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 831. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 833 (“In cases where the statute of conviction includes some crimes that involve
moral turpitude and some that do not, adjudicators must determine if the statute is divisible and thus 
susceptible to a modified categorical analysis. Under such an analysis, resort to the record of 
conviction is permitted to identify the statutory provision that the respondent was convicted of 
violating.”). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 835 (“Because section 21.11(a)(1) is broad enough to punish behavior that is not
accompanied by the defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a minor, the offense does not 
necessarily involve moral turpitude.”). 
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probability test nor the least culpable conduct test considers the 
noncitizen’s specific conduct, it is inaccurate to suggest that either 
categorical approach is truly equipped to assess a noncitizen’s morality. 
When we acknowledge this reality, we must reach the following 
conclusion: the categorical approach that most favors the noncitizen must 
be applied,97 for it is the noncitizen facing the severe consequence of 
removal. Not only does a history of strong legal precedent support this 
conclusion, but our notions regarding access to the legal system demand 
it. 
A. Legal Precedent Requires Application of the Least Culpable 
Conduct Test 
1. Historically, the Least Culpable Conduct Test was Widely
Accepted
Prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I opinion, application of the least 
culpable conduct test was common. In that opinion, Mukasey suggested 
that the circuit courts have traditionally applied differing categorical tests, 
with some applying the realistic probability test and others applying the 
least culpable conduct test.98 This characterization may not have been 
entirely accurate.99 Research suggests that the least culpable conduct test 
has a much richer history than does the realistic probability test. Thus, 
Mukasey was correct to point out that the Third and Fifth Circuits have 
historically applied the least culpable conduct test.100 But his claim that 
the First and Eighth Circuits applied the realistic probability test was 
97. See infra Part II. The Supreme Court has recognized that removal is akin to a criminal
punishment, in that it is a particularly severe legal consequence. As a result, the Court has consistently 
held that noncitizens facing removal—like defendants in a criminal case—are afforded certain 
protections. Among those protections is the immigration rule of lenity. Just as criminal statutes are to 
be interpreted in a manner that favors the accused, the immigration rule of lenity mandates that 
immigration statutes be interpreted in favor of the noncitizen. See infra Part II. 
98. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 550 (“The absence of an authoritative administrative methodology for resolving moral 
turpitude inquiries has resulted in different approaches across the country.”).  
99. Cate McGuire, Note, An Unrealistic Burden: Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude and Silva-
Trevino’s Realistic Probability Test, 30 REV. LITIG. 607, 623 (2011) (“In highlighting the perceived 
lack of uniformity among circuits in applying the . . . [realistic probability test], the Attorney General 
referred to the First and Eighth Circuits as having ‘considered the “general nature” of the crime and 
its classification in “common usage’’’ to make the moral turpitude determination.”) (citing Matter of 
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N Dec. at 693-94).  
 100.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693. The Third and Fifth Circuits, for example, 
have held that convictions under a criminal statute may categorically be considered crimes involving 
moral turpitude only if an examination of the statute reveals that even the most minimal conduct that 
could hypothetically permit a conviction necessarily would involve moral turpitude. Id. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss2/8
2017] ON MORAL GROUNDS 591 
probably an overstatement.101 
An analysis of case law shows that the least culpable conduct test is 
deeply embedded in our legal history. From as early as 1939, circuit courts 
applied reasoning that resembled the least culpable conduct test. In United 
States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, for instance, the Second Circuit considered 
whether the noncitizen’s conviction for possession of a jimmy (a small 
crow bar) with the intent to commit a crime was a CIMT.102 The court 
reasoned that the answer to this question turns on the intended illicit use 
of the jimmy.103 The court recognized, however, that deporting officials 
may not consider the noncitizen’s particular conduct that gave rise to the 
conviction.104 Therefore, the court decided that the noncitizen’s 
possession of a jimmy with the intent to commit a crime is only a CIMT 
so long as “all crimes which he may intend are ‘necessarily’, or 
‘inherently’, immoral.”105 In other words, the court applied the least 
culpable conduct test, identifying the minimal conduct for which a person 
can be convicted under the statute. The court concluded that youthful boys 
often use a jimmy to forcefully enter buildings out of a love for mischief, 
conduct that the court considered entirely innocent.106 As the court put it, 
“[s]uch conduct is no more than a youthful prank, to which most high-
spirited boys are more or less prone; it would be to the last degree pedantic 
to hold that it involved moral turpitude and to visit upon it the dreadful 
penalty of banishment.”107 
The Fifth Circuit borrowed the Second Circuit’s reasoning. In its 
Hamdan v. INS case, the petitioner had been convicted under Louisiana’s 
simple kidnapping statute.108 The petitioner argued that the Louisiana 
statute defines five categories of kidnapping, one of which criminalizes 
removal of a child by a parent lacking custody.109 Citing the Second 
Circuit’s Guarino v. Uhl decision, the court provided: “absent specific 
evidence to the contrary in the record of conviction, the statute must be 
read at the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction 
under the statute.”110 Because the statute extends to at least some conduct 
101.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 694. 
 102.  United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939) (internal citations 
omitted).  
103.  Id. 
104.  Id.  
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1996). 
109.  Id. at 187. 
110.  Id. at 189. 
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that is not inherently morally turpitudinous, the court remanded the case 
to the BIA to determine (from the record of conviction) under what section 
of the statute the petitioner had been convicted.111 
The Fifth Circuit again applied this logic in 2006. In Amouzadeh v. 
Winfrey, the petitioner had been convicted of two crimes: knowingly 
procuring naturalization contrary to law and drug trafficking.112 In 
determining whether these crimes involved morally turpitudinous 
behavior, the Fifth Circuit applied the least culpable conduct test, stating 
that the statute should be read at “its minimum.”113 If the statute might 
criminalize conduct that is not morally turpitudinous, the Fifth Circuit 
reasoned, then the conviction is not one involving moral turpitude.114 
Though the court only considered the minimum conduct necessary to 
sustain the petitioner’s convictions, the petitioner was found to have 
committed two CIMTs (as both of his convictions required a culpable 
state of mind).115 
Following the Second Circuit’s Guarino v. Uhl decision and the Fifth 
Circuit’s Hamdan decision, other circuits followed suit and chose to apply 
the least culpable conduct test. In Partyka v. Attorney General, the Third 
Circuit considered whether a petitioner’s conviction under a New Jersey 
aggravated assault statute constituted a CIMT.116 Indicating that it must 
“ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction 
under the statute,” the court considered the elements of New Jersey’s 
aggravated assault statute.117 The language of that statute permits 
convictions based on the negligent infliction of bodily harm.118 As a 
result, the court reached this conclusion: “the hallmark of moral turpitude 
is a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of 
consciousness or deliberation. The negligent infliction of bodily injury 
lacks this essential culpability requirement.”119 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit applied the same categorical approach in its 
Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler decision. In that case, the petitioner was 
convicted of a California statute that prohibits a person 21 years-old or 
older from engaging in sexual intercourse with any person under the age 
111.  Id. 
112.  Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 2006). 
113.  Id. at 455. 
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. at 458. 
116.  Partyka v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 417 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2005). 
117.  Id. at 411. 
118.  Id. at 412. 
119.  Id. at 414. 
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of 16.120 Again, the court looked not at the petitioner’s specific conduct 
but at the entire range of conduct prohibited by the statute.121 The court 
theorized that this specific statute could criminalize consensual 
intercourse between a college sophomore and a high-school junior and 
that the relationship could have begun when both were high school 
students.122 Given this theoretical scenario, the court decided that the 
statute criminalizes at least some behavior that is not morally 
turpitudinous; “such behavior may be unwise and socially unacceptable 
to many, but it is not ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved.’”123 
The cases discussed above demand the following realization: prior to 
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I decision, there was strong legal precedent 
supporting application of the least culpable conduct test. The same cannot 
be said for application of the realistic probability test in the context of 
CIMTs. 
2. The Emergence of the Realistic Probability Test is Based on
Faulty Logic Contained in Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I Opinion
According to the BIA’s modern standard, immigration judges must 
apply the realistic probability test. A noncitizen must prove that there is a 
realistic chance that a statute could be applied to conduct that is not 
morally turpitudinous. This differs from the least culpable conduct test in 
that it requires a noncitizen to point to an actual case where a particular 
statute was violated without moral turpitude. 
Unlike the least culpable conduct test, this realistic probability test 
has a shallow history. Its application to the identification of CIMTs is 
largely born out of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I opinion—an opinion that 
employed questionable logic to support its conclusions. 
First, in support of his application of the realistic probability test, 
Mukasey incorrectly relied upon the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez.124 (The BIA’s modern framework has 
borrowed this reasoning and also overstates the Duenas-Alverez 
holding.125) Although the Supreme Court applied a realistic probability 
120.  Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007). 
121.  Id. at 692. 
122.  Id. at 693. 
123.  Id. (citing Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
124.  Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“Moreover, in our view, to find 
that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute 
requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a 
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that 
falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”). 
125.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016).  
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test in that case, it did not do so in order to identify morally turpitudinous 
conduct, and it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
can extend beyond the context in which the Duenes-Alverez case was 
decided.126 
In Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the respondent faced deportation 
after he was convicted under a California statute that criminalizes theft of 
a vehicle (and aiding and abetting a theft of a vehicle).127 Because the INA 
calls for removal when a noncitizen has been convicted of a generic theft 
offense,128 the federal government began removal proceedings against the 
respondent.129 A major issue in this case can be articulated as follows: 
does the California statute criminalize generic theft offenses? 
The respondent argued that his conviction was not an adequate 
ground for removal. He claimed that the California statute criminalized 
behavior that most jurisdictions would not consider “theft”; he said that 
“California’s doctrine, unlike that of most other States, makes a defendant 
criminally liable for conduct that the defendant did not intend, not even as 
a known or almost certain byproduct of the defendant’s intentional 
acts.”130 In support of this contention, the respondent suggested that a 
person who wrongly purchased alcohol for an underage drinker could be 
convicted under the California statute for that drinker’s unforeseen 
reckless driving.131 While the immigration judge and the BIA found the 
petitioner to be removable, the Ninth Circuit held that the California 
statute extends to conduct that is not generic theft and remanded the case 
to the BIA.132 The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.133 
According to the Supreme Court, the respondent’s argument failed 
because it was rooted in fiction, not fact: 
To find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition 
 126.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). The Supreme Court has decided at least one 
other case where it cited its own Duenas-Alvarez decision. The Supreme Court’s subsequent 
discussion of the case’s holding, however, does nothing to suggest that the realistic probability test 
can be used to identify CIMTs. Instead, it merely quotes language from the Duenas-Alvarez decision 
and applies this language to a case regarding the classification of a drug trafficking conviction. Id. 
127.  Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 187-89. 
 128.  8 USC § 1227 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“Any alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”); 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(G) (LEXIS 
through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“[A]ggravated felony means . . . a theft offense . . . or burglary offense 
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”).  
129.  Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 187. 
130.  Id. at 191. 
131.  Id.  
132.  Id. at 184, *syllabus.  
133.  Id. at 188. 
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of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application 
of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic 
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its 
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.134 
The Supreme Court stated that the respondent could demonstrate this 
realistic probability by either pointing to his own case or to another case 
where a court actually applied the statute to the conduct that respondent 
described.135 
Several circuit courts criticized Mukasey’s decision to apply this 
holding to the identification of CIMTs. In its Jean-Louis decision, the 
Third Circuit “seriously doubt[ed] that the logic of the Supreme Court in 
Duenas-Alvarez . . . is transferable to the CIMT context.”136 In the 
Duenas-Alvarez case, the respondent’s theoretical/imaginary criminal 
conduct—buying alcohol for an underage drinker—may not have even 
been a violation of the California statute criminalizing theft of a vehicle.137 
Proper application of a least-culpable conduct test, according to the Third 
Circuit, does not involve this kind of “imagination.”138 When the elements 
of a statute are clearly enumerated, the theoretical scenario can 
unmistakably meet those elements; speculation as to whether the conduct 
can lead to a conviction is unnecessary.139 
After incorrectly citing the Supreme Court’s Duenas-Alvarez case to 
support his application of the realistic probability test, Mukasey then 
asserted that some circuit courts have also used this test to identify 
CIMTs.140 Specifically, Mukasey mentioned the First Circuit’s Pino v. 
Nicolls decision and the Eighth Circuit’s Marciano v. INS decision.141 
Again, these cases did not clearly support application of the realistic 
probability test. 
In its Pino v. Nicolls decision, the First Circuit merely recognized 
that there is criticism regarding categorical approaches because they do 
134.  Id. at 193. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009). 
137.  Id. (“In fact, the parties vigorously disputed whether California courts would permit 
application of the statute to a defendant who had committed acts resulting in a crime, but where the 
commission of the crime itself was not intended.”).  
138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. (“Here, by contrast, no application of ‘legal imagination’ to the Pennsylvania simple 
assault statute is necessary. The elements of 2701 are clear, and the ability of the government to 
prosecute a defendant under subpart 2701(b)(2)—even where the defendant is unaware of the victim’s 
age—is not disputed.”).  
140.  See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 550. 
 141.  Id.  
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not allow the immigration judge to consider facts beyond the record of 
conviction.142 In that case, the issue was whether the petitioner had been 
convicted of a crime of larceny, not whether the crime of larceny should 
be classified as a CIMT.143 Therefore, the First Circuit’s discussion 
regarding the identification of CIMTs is only considered dicta. 
In this discussion, the court acknowledged that the accuracy of 
categorical approaches are limited: if pure motives result in criminal 
activity (like the theft of food for one’s hungry child or the stealing of a 
turkey as a college prank) and these pure motives do not constitute a legal 
defense, a categorical approach cannot recognize those pure motives.144 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that immigration judges should not 
assess a noncitizen’s specific conduct: 
if the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage would 
be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, neither the adminis-
trative officials in a deportation proceeding nor the courts on review of 
administrative action are under the oppressive burden of taking and con-
sidering evidence of the circumstances of a particular offense.145 
Mukasey interpreted the “general nature” and “common usage” language 
as an endorsement of the realistic probability test.146 Others have 
interpreted this language differently, contending that the First Circuit did 
not actually subscribe to a realistic probability approach. Instead, it merely 
emphasized that categorical approaches forbid judges to look beyond the 
noncitizen’s record of conviction and consider the noncitizen’s actual 
conduct.147 
To further support his claim that the circuits were divided as to which 
categorical approach to apply, Mukasey cited the dissenting opinion of the 
Eighth Circuit’s Marciano v. INS decision.148 Though the dissent 
characterized the majority as having applied a realistic probability 
142.  Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954). 
 143.  Id. (“Appellant has made no contention in this court that the crime of larceny is not properly 
to be classified in the general category of crimes involving moral turpitude. It is well-settled that, in 
ordinary acceptation, the crime of larceny, whether grand or petty, is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”). 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 550. 
 147.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 624 (2011) (“In other words, the court was emphasizing the 
importance of the categorical approach. Because criminal statutes by their plain language do not make 
non-criminal intentions an affirmative defense, moral turpitude will necessarily inhere even when the 
underlying facts demonstrate pure intentions.”).  
148.  450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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approach, it is unclear whether the majority actually did so.149 
In the Marciano case, the petitioner was an alien from Morocco who 
was convicted of statutory rape under a Minnesota statute.150 The 
petitioner argued that his conviction was not a CIMT because the statute 
criminalizes sexual relationships with a person between the ages of 16 and 
18 years of age without requiring proof of criminal intent.151 In assessing 
the petitioner’s argument, the majority never mentioned application of the 
realistic probability test. Instead, the court cited prior cases regarding 
statutory rape,152 and it looked at the record of conviction to determine 
that the petitioner knew of the victim’s age.153 The majority then held that 
the petitioner had committed a crime involving morally turpitudinous 
behavior.154 
Only the dissenting judge deliberated over how to properly identify 
CIMTs.155 He criticized the First Circuit’s Pino v. Nicolls decision, 
claiming that it was wrong to look only at the “general nature” of a statute 
to determine whether that statute is used to criminalize morally 
turpitudinous conduct.156 The dissenting judge claimed that the majority 
had, in effect, adopted this logic.157 But it does not appear that the 
dissenting judge criticized the majority for applying what he considered a 
realistic probability test; instead, it seems as though he was critical of all 
categorical approaches, as they do not allow consideration of the 
noncitizen’s specific conduct.158 In fact, despite concerns regarding 
149.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 624. 
150.  Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1023. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. at 1025 (“Federal courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”). 
 153.  Id. (“The court also found and determined that [the petitioner] was told by his victim that 
she was fifteen or sixteen years of age prior to the commission of the offense, that the petitioner had 
sexual intercourse with the victim on the date charged, and that petitioner was the aggressor.”).  
 154.  Id. (“The Board properly determined that the statutory rape charge upon which the 
petitioner was convicted is a crime involving moral turpitude.”). 
155.  Id. at 1026 (Eisele, J., dissenting). 
 156.  Id. at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that Pino v. Nicolls adopted the best rule 
when it asked that the Service and the reviewing courts look only to the ‘general nature’ of the crime 
and its classification in ‘common usage.’”). 
157.  Id. (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“The majority here takes the same approach, and this is the point 
at which my disagreement begins.”). 
 158.  Id. at 1029 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“Since moral turpitude is different from criminality, the 
statute seems to require that that element be assessed separately. Undoubtedly it is difficult for the 
Service to make continual determinations of the nation’s shifting and often indistinct moral standards. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that such determinations are what the law requires. Considerations of 
administrative convenience should certainly be secondary to the determination and enforcement of 
the obvious legislative intent. It may or may not be wise to charge an administrative agency with this 
sort of duty, but Congress has done so and the Supreme Court has said that the standard provided is 
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judicial efficiency, the dissenting judge advocated for a factual inquiry 
into the petitioner’s actual behavior.159 
A close reading of the cases discussed in Silva-Trevino I shows 
that—unlike the least culpable conduct test—the realistic probability test 
was not widely applied prior to 2008. To the contrary, application of the 
realistic probability test in the context of CIMTs seems to be based on 
unsound legal reasoning. (It is worth noting that in its latest Silva-Trevino 
III opinion, the BIA cited several circuit cases that have applied the 
realistic probability standard; most of those cases, however, merely 
adopted this standard based on the Silva-Trevino I opinion.160) 
As one scholar concluded, this “erosion of immigration law 
precedent is based largely on a faulty interpretation of a Supreme Court 
case combined with mischaracterization of the tests employed by the 
various circuits when applying the categorical approach.”161 
B. The Realistic Probability Test Violates the Immigration Lenity 
Doctrine 
Not only is the realistic probability test the product of questionable 
legal reasoning, it may also constitute a violation of the immigration lenity 
doctrine. 
In Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, the Supreme Court recognized that 
deportation is a “drastic measure”—that it “is the forfeiture for 
misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a 
penalty.”162 From that decision, the immigration lenity doctrine emerged; 
the Supreme Court decided that deportation decisions are to be construed 
strictly in favor of the noncitizen.163 Since that decision, the Supreme 
Court—along with lower courts—has consistently maintained the 
immigration lenity doctrine.164 (Moreover, there is legal evidence to 
suggest that this doctrine does not merely apply to issues of deportability, 
but that its applicability extends to issues of admissibility as well.165) 
sufficiently definite that administrators will be able to apply it.”). 
 159.  Id. at 1031 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“On the present record, neither this Court, nor anyone 
else, could accurately and fairly determine whether [petitioner’s] crime involved moral turpitude. I 
would remand the case in order that this essential factual question might be determined.”). 
160.  Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2011). 
161.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 636-37. 
162.  Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). 
163.  Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 519 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has a long history of 
construing immigration statutes narrowly in favor of noncitizens in certain circumstances.”). 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. at 525. 
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For the reasons that follow, I propose that the BIA’s interpretation of 
moral turpitude provisions violates the long-standing immigration lenity 
doctrine. The BIA has not interpreted the INA in a manner most favorable 
to noncitizens facing removal. Instead, its adoption of the realistic 
probability test creates confusion, possibly limiting legal arguments 
available to noncitizens and inappropriately placing a burden of proof on 
noncitizens facing removal. 
1. Unlike the Least Culpable Conduct Test, The Realistic
Probability Test Contains Ambiguities
The least culpable conduct test is unambiguous. To classify a 
conviction as a CIMT, this test undoubtedly requires a reading of the 
statute, a determination of the statute’s elements, and a finding that all 
convictions under the statute require morally turpitudinous conduct.166 
Application of the realistic probability test is not nearly as clear. 
As indicated above, the realistic probability test forces the court to 
look at actual case law to identify a CIMT. To prove that his crime is not 
a CIMT, a noncitizen must find a case demonstrating that the statute under 
which he was convicted has previously been applied to conduct short of 
moral turpitude.167 
It is unclear, however, what forms of evidence are acceptable to 
prove the existence of such a case. At least one law review article provides 
that acceptable forms of evidence include “published decisions, 
unpublished decisions, and plea transcripts, including those from a 
noncitizen’s own criminal case.”168 The same law review article suggests 
that when the noncitizen uses plea transcripts from his own criminal case, 
the realistic probability test no longer functions as a strictly categorical 
approach. It, instead, allows consideration of the facts underlying the 
conviction and forces the court to determine if the noncitizen’s specific 
conduct involved moral turpitude.169 
 166.  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 582 F.3d 462, 465, 482 (3d Cir. 2009). The least 
culpable conduct test merely requires the court to ascertain the elements of a statute and determine 
whether all convictions under that statute involve moral turpitude. Therefore, courts applying this test 
have been able to develop a body of precedent that details which convictions constitute CIMTs and 
which do not. Id.  
 167.  Dadhania, supra note 11, at 328 (“Adjudicators focus on the actual scope of the statute of 
conviction by asking whether any actual case exists where the criminal statute was applied to conduct 
that was not turpitudinous. A noncitizen must provide evidence of an actual case where the statute in 
question was used to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude.”).   
168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. at n.75 (“If a noncitizen uses her own case to demonstrate that the criminal statute has 
been applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, the court must determine whether her 
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This is problematic for two reasons. First, Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino 
I opinion was vacated because it allowed inquiry beyond a noncitizen’s 
record of conviction and into the particular facts of the noncitizen’s case. 
Circuit courts considered this external inquiry a clear violation of the 
unambiguous language of the INA.170 Use of the noncitizen’s own record 
to satisfy the realistic probability test comes dangerously close to this 
vacated inquiry, inasmuch as it requires courts to assess the noncitizen’s 
actual conduct.171 Second, the BIA’s latest framework seems to plainly 
forbid the noncitizen from using facts contained in his own record to 
satisfy the realistic probability test. The BIA’s latest framework states that 
the record of conviction can only be considered when a statute is divisible; 
it is permitted for the limited purpose of identifying “the statutory 
provision that the respondent was convicted of violating.”172 
If a noncitizen cannot point to the facts of his own case to show that 
a particular statute can be violated without moral turpitude, the realistic 
probability test creates a very serious problem. It eliminates a potential 
argument for a noncitizen who was convicted of a crime under an entirely 
novel set of facts—perhaps the only set of facts that led to a particular 
conviction without involving moral turpitude. 
To illustrate this point, imagine that noncitizen Brinsley has been 
convicted under State X’s hypothetical burglary statute. After Brinsley’s 
landlord wrongly used self-help to retake possession of the house in which 
Brinsley had been living, she found herself without access to shelter and 
without adequate protection from the cold weather. To prevent the 
possible onset of frostbite, Brinsley broke a storefront’s expensive 
window, intending to steal a pair of winter boots she saw on a store shelf. 
But as she left the scene, the store owner—who lived in an apartment 
above the store—hurried down the stairs and called the police. Brinsley 
was subsequently charged with burglary, which is defined in State X as 
trespass in an occupied habitation with the intent to commit any criminal 
offense. Brinsley’s defense of necessity failed, and she was convicted of 
burglary. Following her conviction, removal proceedings were initiated 
against Brinsley. In an attempt to obtain discretionary relief from removal, 
Brinsley sought to establish that her conviction did not constitute a CIMT. 
Though Brinsley’s actions may not seem morally depraved, there are no 
actions involved moral turpitude, arguably going beyond a categorical approach. Although the 
categorical approach generally forbids inquiry into the facts underlying a conviction, the realistic 
probability test would permit such an inquiry under these circumstances.”). 
170.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
171.  Dadhania, supra note 11, at n.75. 
172.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 833 (B.I.A. 2016). 
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State X opinions that detail a burglary conviction resulting from conduct 
that was short of moral turpitude. 
Under the realistic probability test, Brinsley might not be able to 
point to the facts of her own criminal case to establish that the statute can 
be violated without morally turpitudinous behavior. Moreover, the court 
would not be able to consider the entire range of hypothetical situations 
that could lead to a burglary conviction. As a result, Brinsley’s conviction 
might be inaccurately labeled a crime of moral turpitude. 
2. The Realistic Probability Test Places a Heavy Burden of Proof
on the Noncitizen
It remains unclear whether a noncitizen will be able to satisfy the 
realistic probability test with facts from his own case. But the fact that the 
noncitizen has to point to facts of any case is problematic. 
The INA details removability proceedings.173 These proceedings 
govern both inadmissibility and deportability decisions, as both 
determinations can lead to a noncitizen’s removal from the country. In a 
proceeding that determines a noncitizen’s admissibility, the noncitizen 
always bears the burden of proof.174 In proceedings regarding 
deportability, though, the INA places the burden of proof squarely on the 
government; the “[s]ervice has the burden of establishing by clear and 
convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted 
to the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability 
shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence.”175 
Despite the fact that the INA provides these removability procedures, 
the realistic probability test—as it is described in the Duenas-Alvarez 
case—requires the noncitizen to show that the statute under which he was 
convicted can be violated without morally turpitudinous conduct.176 (He 
does so by citing a case where the statute has been violated without moral 
turpitude.177) When the realistic probability test is applied during a 
deportability proceeding, the realistic probability test may violate the 
 173.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“In general. An immigration 
judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”). 
 174.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“In the proceeding the alien 
has the burden of establishing— (A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly 
and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible under section 1182 of this title; or 
(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States pursuant 
to a prior admission.”). 
175.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244). 
176.  Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 192 (2007). 
177.  Dadhania, supra note 11, at 328. 
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INA’s statutory language. Some have expressed concern that the test 
impermissibly shifts the government’s burden of proof onto the 
noncitizen.178 
The Third Circuit’s Jean-Louis v. Attorney General of the United 
States decision addressed this concern: 
Also unanswered is whether the government or the alien bears the bur-
den of demonstrating a prior application of the statute of conviction to 
non-turpitudinous conduct, and the applicability of unreported criminal 
cases . . . Although the INA allocates the burden of establishing remov-
ability to the government . . . Duenas-Alvarez appears to shift this bur-
den to the alien.179 
Even if application of the realistic probability test does not violate the 
INA’s burden of proof provisions, the test still poses a practical problem 
for many noncitizens facing removal. 
Although noncitizens have a right to representation in immigration 
court,180 most go unrepresented.181 And not surprisingly, those who go 
without representation fare much worse in court.182 Using relief from 
removal and termination charges as measurements of an immigrant’s 
success in court, one study concluded that there is a strong correlation 
between representation and success.183 For example, represented 
noncitizens that had never been detained experienced legal success in 60% 
of removal cases, while similarly situated pro se litigants experienced 
success in just 17% of the same kind of cases.184 
By demanding that noncitizens provide evidence of case law during 
removability proceedings, the realistic probability test could severely 
hinder a noncitizen’s ability to succeed in court. Without representation, 
 178.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 626 (“Courts criticizing the realistic probability test have noted 
that it may impermissibly shift the burden of demonstrating realistic probability to defendant 
noncitizens in deportation proceedings, even though the government has the burden of proof in 
demonstrating removability.”).  
179.  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 180.  Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
181.  Id. at 75 (“We reveal that during the time period of our study, 63% of all immigrants went 
to court without an attorney. Detained immigrants were even less likely to obtain counsel—86% 
attended their court hearings without an attorney.”).  
 182.  Id. at 9 (“With respect to the efficacy of representation, we find that immigrants who are 
represented by counsel do fare better at every stage of the court process—that is, their cases are more 
likely to be terminated, they are more likely to seek relief, and they are more likely to obtain the relief 
they seek.”). 
 183.  Id. at 49 (“Using termination and relief as a combined measurement of success, we find 
that both detained and nondetained immigrants with counsel had higher success rates.”). 
184.  Id. at 50. 
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many noncitizens will not have access to bodies of case law.185 Those that 
do, may not know how to adequately interpret this law—as successful 
interpretation would require a command on the English language and an 
understanding of complicated legal vocabulary.186 To put this into 
perspective, there are significant requirements that must be met before one 
can practice law. These include the following: acquisition of a bachelor’s 
degree from an accredited institution,187 completion of a standardized 
admissions test and a law school curriculum,188 and passage of the bar 
examination.189 
C. Continued Disparities Between Different Jurisdictions Requires the 
Development of a Truly Uniform Standard 
When Attorney General Holder vacated the Silva-Trevino I decision, 
he directed the BIA to develop a uniform framework for the identification 
of CIMTs.190 Strictly speaking, the BIA failed to do so. Recognizing that 
some circuits have rejected application of the realistic probability test, the 
BIA has allowed these jurisdictions to apply their existing precedent: 
In light of this disparity, and in the interest of setting forth a uniform 
national standard, we will apply the Supreme Court’s realistic probabil-
ity test in deciding whether an offense categorically qualifies as a crime 
involving moral turpitude, unless controlling circuit law expressly dic-
tates otherwise.191 
The BIA’s language makes little sense. It concurrently expresses an 
interest in the creation of a uniform standard and allows for different 
jurisdictions to apply differing frameworks. That is hardly a uniform 
standard. 
On the one hand, this is comforting, as it suggests that circuit courts 
that have traditionally applied the least culpable conduct test (like the 
 185.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 629 (“Perhaps the greatest difficulty for most noncitizens who 
must demonstrate realistic probability in such removal proceedings is the pervasive lack of legal 
representation.”). 
 186.  McGuire, supra note 99, at 629 (“Even assuming a perfect sample of reported cases, the 
task will still be difficult. Most noncitizens’ proficiency in English is limited. Noncitizens trying to 
demonstrate realistic probability using cases other than their own must be able to read and understand 
the complicated English contained in legal resources. For these reasons, noncitizens will likely have 
difficulty demonstrating realistic probability, even if one exists.”). 
 187.  ABA Standards & Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 2016 A.B.A. SEC. LEG. 
EDUC. AND ADMIS. TO THE BAR 32. 
188.  Id. at 15. 
189.  Id. at 24. 
190.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 826 (B.I.A. 2016).  
191.  Id. at 832. 
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Third and Fifth Circuits) will likely continue to do so. On the other hand, 
the BIA’s failure to create a truly uniform framework presents its own 
problems. First, the decision to develop a uniform framework for 
assessing CIMTs emerged from the circuit courts’ longstanding struggle 
to apply the INA’s moral turpitude provisions.192 By allowing circuit 
courts to apply differing categorical tests, the BIA has done nothing to 
eliminate the “patchwork of different approaches” that Mukasey sought 
to address in his Silva-Trevino I approach.193 Additionally, inconsistent 
approaches leads to a troubling realization: noncitizens’ morality will be 
determined based on the jurisdiction’s categorical approach, rather than 
on the conviction. One law review article stressed the importance of a 
uniform framework; “A uniform policy would ensure that immigration 
laws do not depend on the location of removal proceedings or on the 
wording of criminal statutes, but on a consistent nationwide application 
of the immigration laws.”194 
V. CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to advance a national system of morals, the legislature 
has long decided to base noncitizens’ deportability and admissibility—at 
least in part—on the severity of their criminal activity. But making 
consequential legal decisions based on a country’s notions of morality is 
inherently problematic, as morality is a nebulous concept. It is subject to 
change as society changes. 
Not surprisingly, then, the circuit courts have historically struggled 
to apply the INA’s moral turpitude provisions, oftentimes adopting 
differing frameworks. Recognizing this problem, Attorney General 
Mukasey established a standard approach to identify CIMTs. Though 
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard has since been vacated, its collapse 
has at least clarified one point: the INA forbids consideration of a 
noncitizen’s specific conduct to determine whether a conviction involved 
moral turpitude. In other words, immigration judges must effectively 
assess a noncitizen’s morality without ever considering the noncitizen’s 
behavior. 
In response to the collapse of Silva-Trevino I, the BIA has revisited 
this issue and has adopted a new, categorical approach to identify CIMTs. 
 192.  See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Federal courts have long struggled in 
administering and applying the Act’s moral turpitude provisions, and there now exists a patchwork 
of different approaches across the nation.”). 
193.  Id. 
194.  Dadhania, supra note 11, at 355. 
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Under this approach, immigration judges are to apply the realistic 
probability test, unless controlling circuit decisions have directed 
otherwise. According to the BIA’s latest framework, a noncitizen can only 
avoid removal by pointing to an actual case where the statute in question 
has been violated with conduct not involving moral turpitude. This 
standard is troubling: it lacks historical support; it places a heavy burden 
of proof on underrepresented noncitizens; and it has done nothing to 
establish a truly uniform approach to the identification of CIMTs. For 
these reasons, the BIA’s latest framework might be classified as a 
violation of the immigration lenity doctrine; it has failed to interpret the 
INA’s moral turpitude provisions in a manner favorable to noncitizens. 
The framework’s reasonableness, then, is immediately questionable, and 
whether circuit courts owe it deference is unclear. 
I have, therefore, advocated for the universal application of a 
different categorical approach—the least culpable conduct test. This test 
has a rich legal history and correctly places the burden of proof squarely 
on the government. In order to remove a noncitizen, under this test, the 
government must prove the following: the minimal conduct necessary for 
a conviction under a given statute involves moral turpitude. This is 
important. So long as immigration judges cannot look beyond a 
noncitizen’s record of conviction to consider his particular behavior, the 
categorical approach that most favors the noncitizen must be applied. That 
approach is the least culpable conduct test. 
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